Confusion Worse Confounded: The North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act by Orth, John V.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 78 | Number 3 Article 5
3-1-2000
Confusion Worse Confounded: The North
Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act
John V. Orth
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John V. Orth, Confusion Worse Confounded: The North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 783 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol78/iss3/5
ESSAY
CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED: THE
NORTH CAROLINA RESIDENTIAL RENTAL
AGREEMENTS ACT
JOHN V. ORTH*
In 1977, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the
Residential Rental Agreements Act in order to abrogate the
common-law rule that landlords, in the absence of an express
covenant to the contrary, have no duty to provide their tenants
with fit and habitable premises. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, recently interpreted the Act to exclude renters of
non-primary residences, such as vacation property. Although the
General Assembly has created new statutory protections for
vacation rentals in reaction to this court case, other renters of
secondary residences may still be unprotected. In this Essay,
Professor Orth examines the court's misreading of both the Act
and the common law, the legislature's attempt to fix the problem,
and potential solutions for the future.
INTRODUCrION
Suppose grandparents lease a beach house for two weeks and
invite their children and grandchildren for a family vacation. After
dinner one night, they all assemble on the second-story deck for a
family photograph. Holding the camera, the grandmother stands with
her back to the house, while the rest of the family lines up against the
far railing with the ocean behind them. At that moment, the deck
separates from the house and collapses, injuring every member of the
family.
On essentially this statement of facts, the North Carolina
Supreme Court unanimously held on April 9, 1999, in Conley v.
Emerald Isle Realty, Inc.,' that the injured parties had no cause of
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. A.B., 1969, Oberlin College; J.D., 1974, M.A., 1975, Ph.D., 1977, Harvard University
1. 350 N.C. 293,513 S.E.2d 556 (1999) (reversing the court of appeals and remanding
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action against the owners of the house or the real estate company that
managed and rented the property. According to the court, the
Residential Rental Agreements Act,2 which requires residential
landlords to "[m]ake all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put
and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, 3 imposed no
duty on the landlord because the family had not rented the beach
house as its primary residence In addition, the court held that the
common law imposed no duty of fitness on a residential landlord,
even one renting furnished dwellings for a short term.5 Both holdings
were wrong.
On August 5, 1999, the North Carolina General Assembly
responded to the decision in Conley by enacting the North Carolina
Vacation Rental Act and amending the Residential Rental
Agreements Act.6 For rental agreements entered into on or after
January 1, 2000, the Vacation Rental Act extends the landlord's duty
to provide "fit and habitable ' 7 premises to a "vacation rental,"
defined as "[t]he rental of residential property for vacation, leisure, or
recreational purposes for fewer than 90 days by a person who has a
place of permanent residence to which he or she intends to return. '8
Had it been in effect at the time of the accident litigated in Conley,
the Vacation Rental Act would presumably have altered the outcome
of the case.
In addition to enacting the Vacation Rental Act, the General
Assembly also amended the Residential Rental Agreements Act by
excluding vacation rentals from its coverage9 and by altering the
definition of the word "premises."10 While solving the problem of
for reinstatement of a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants). Justice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of the
case; previously, as a judge on the court of appeals, he had joined in the decision that was
reversed. Under the actual facts of the case, a married son and his spouse had rented the
beach house for a vacation that included three generations of the family. See id. at 294-95,
513 S.E.2d at 558.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -49 (1994 & Supp. 1998), amended by N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42-39, -40 (Lexis 1999).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(2) (Supp. 1998).
4. See Conley, 350 N.C. at 295,513 S.E.2d at 558.
5. See id. at 297,513 S.E.2d at 559.
6. S.L. 1999-420 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-39, -40, 42A-1 to -40
(Lexis 1999)).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42A-31 ("A landlord of a residential property used for a
vacation rental shall ... [miake all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put
and keep the property in a fit and habitable condition.").
8. Id. § 42A-4(3).
9. See id. § 42-39(al); infra note 12 and accompanying text.
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2); infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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vacation rentals created by the holding in Conley, the new legislation
does not necessarily solve the problem with regard to other rentals of
residential property by those with primary residences elsewhere, such
as college students and workers on assignment away from home.
Thus, a significant portion of North Carolina renters may still have no
legal redress against their landlords for failing to keep properties in
habitable condition unless the courts or the General Assembly act
again to correct the errors made in Conley.
I. THE RESIDENTIAL RNTAL AGREEMEiTus ACT
The Residential Rental Agreements Act reversed the common-
law rule that landlords have no duty, in the absence of express
covenants, to provide residential tenants with habitable premises.
The Act, which was passed in 1977, "determines the rights,
obligations, and remedies under a rental agreement for a dwelling
unit within this State."'" The only rental agreements originally
excluded from coverage were those involving (1) "transient
occupancy in a hotel, motel, or similar lodging subject to regulation
by the Commission for Health Services"; and (2) "any dwelling[s]
furnished without charge or rent."'12 Residential landlords were
required "to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable
condition."' 3  The Act originally defined the word "premises" to
mean "a dwelling unit, including mobile homes or mobile home
spaces, and the structure of which it is a part and facilities and
appurtenances therein and grounds, areas, and facilities normally held
out for the use of residential tenants who are using the dwelling unit
as their primary residence."' 4 Nowhere did the Act define the words
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-38 (1994).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-39(a), (b) (1994), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
39(al) (Lexis 1999). Incident to its adoption of the new Vacation Rental Act, the General
Assembly amended the exclusions in the Residential Rental Agreements Act by adding a
new subsection to read: "The provisions of this Article shall not apply to vacation rentals
entered into under Chapter 42A of the General Statutes." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
39(al).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(2) (Supp. 1998). The landlord's duty is non-waivable:
"The landlord is not released of his obligations under any part of this section by the
tenant's explicit or implicit acceptance of the landlord's failure to provide premises
complying with this section, whether done before the lease was made, when it was made,
or after it was made .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(b).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2) (1994), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2)
(Lexis 1999). Incident to its adoption of the new Vacation Rental Act, the General
Assembly amended the definition of "premises" in the Residential Rental Agreements
Act by deleting the words "who are using the dwelling unit as their primary residence."
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2); infra note 68 and accompanying text.
The Residential Rental Agreements Act defines only two other terms, "action"
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"residential tenants" or "dwelling unit."
In Conley, the North Carolina Supreme Court misread the
definition of "premises" and limited the application of the Residential
Rental Agreements Act to "premises which are 'normally held out for
the use of residential tenants who are using the dwelling unit as their
primary residence.' "15 There was no question in Conley that the
injured family had a "rental agreement" or that the owners and the
real estate company were "landlords" as defined by the Act. 6 As
part of the structure of the beach house, the deck clearly would be
included in the "premises" defined by the Act." While the Act in its
final section provides that "[a] violation of this Article shall not
constitute negligence per se," 18 a violation can be used as evidence of
negligence. 19 But for the court's misreading, the injured family would
have had a cause of action.
The court's reading of the Act was inconsistent with both the
definition of "premises" and the structure of the statute. The
Residential Rental Agreements Act defined "premises" to mean "a
dwelling unit." Dwelling units included, as the definition made clear,
"mobile homes or mobile home spaces." "Premises" also
encompassed "the structure of which [the dwelling unit] is a part and
facilities and appurtenances therein" and certain "grounds, areas, and
and "landlord." An "action" under the Act "includes recoupment, counterclaim, defense,
setoff, and any other proceeding including an action for possession." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-40(1) (1994). The Act defines "landlord" as "any owner and any rental management
company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an
agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(3) (1994).
15. Conley, 350 N.C. at 295, 513 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2)
(1994)). The court's statement that, as originally adopted, "the Act specifically does not
apply to short-term vacation rentals," id. at 296, 513 S.E.2d at 558, is simply incorrect. See
infra notes 20-31and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 12 and 14.
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2) (1994), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
40(2) (Lexis 1999). The amended statute retains the definition of "premises" as applying
to "the structure of which [a dwelling unit] is a part and facilities and appurtenances
therein," but amending other parts of the definition. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
40(2).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(d) (Supp. 1998).
19. See Brooks v. Francis, 57 N.C. App. 556, 559, 291 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1982) (holding
that a violation of a statutory duty is evidence of negligence); O'Neal v. Kellett, 55 N.C.
App. 225, 228, 284 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1981) (same); Lenz v. Ridgewood Assocs., 55 N.C.
App. 115, 119-20, 284 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1981) (same); see also Theodore 0. Fillette, III,
North Carolina's Residential Rental Agreements Act: New Developments for Contract and
Tort Liability in Landlord-Tenant Relations, 56 N.C. L. REV. 785, 805-06 (1978) ("The net
effect of the new standard of care for providing and maintaining fit premises may be to
allow violations of the [Residential Rental Agreements] Act to be used as evidence of
ordinary negligence.").
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facilities" particularly described as those "normally held out for the
use of residential tenants who are using the dwelling unit as their
primary residence." 20 The Act's reference to the tenants' use of the
dwelling unit as their "primary residence" specifically referred only to
the "grounds, areas, and facilities" to be included as part of the
premises.' Indeed, the grammatical structure of the sentence
defining "premises" showed that what was listed as included in the
Act's coverage was not intended to restrict the scope of the Act, but
rather to expand it by providing examples of what was covered.
In addition, the reference to "primary residence" did not appear
in the section concerning the Act's application and did not limit the
type of "dwelling unit" covered by the Act. Residences other than
the "primary residence" were not mentioned in the section of
exclusions, which excluded only "transient occupancy" in public
accommodations and gratuitous leases. The legislature's omission of
limitations on the dwelling units covered by the Act and failure to
exclude a dwelling unit not used as a "primary residence" supported
the inference that all rented dwelling units were within the scope of
the Residential Rental Agreements Act. A canon of statutory
construction as old as Blackstone provides that "[o]ne part of a
statute must be so construed by another that the whole may if
possible stand."'
The court's error concerning the scope of the Residential Rental
Agreements Act may stem from a 1991 case decided by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, Baker v. Rushing?3 In that case, residents
of a building styled by its owners as a "hotel" claimed to be covered
by the Act.24 In determining whether the residents were tenants of
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2) (1994), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2)
(Lexis 1999). As discussed supra note 12, the General Assembly responded to Conley by
amending the definition of "premises" in the Residential Rental Agreements Act by
deleting the words "who are using the dwelling unit as their primary residence." N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2).
21. By limiting the "grounds, areas, and facilities" to be included as part of the
premises to those "normally held out for the use of residential tenants who are using the
dwelling unit as their primary residence," the General Assembly presumably intended to
answer such questions as whether the Act applied to exterior seating or a children's
playground.
22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 89
(facsimile 1979) (1765).
23. 104 N.C. App. 240,409 S.E.2d 108 (1991).
24. See id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112. The residents also claimed the protection of a
state law limiting the means by which landlords may evict tenants to those prescribed by
statute. See id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-25.6). The background of Baker, as reported
in a state legal newspaper, was that developers had bought a run-down hotel, planning to
renovate and convert it into an office building, and had required the residents to vacate
20001
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dwelling units or transients occupying hotel rooms, the court of
appeals examined numerous items of evidence, including proof
showing that the tenants had no other residences. zs In looking
beyond the label attached to the building and considering the true
relationship of the parties, the court of appeals was clearly correct.
The error came in the court's statement that the Act "provides
protection to those persons occupying 'a dwelling unit ... normally
held out for the use of residential tenants who are using the dwelling
unit as their primary residence.' "26 Of course, the correct statement
would have been that the Act provided protection to tenants "under a
rental agreement for a dwelling unit."'27 The only possible relevance
of whether the tenants were using the dwelling unit as their "primary
residence" would have been to ascertain which "grounds, areas, and
facilities" were covered by the Act: those "normally held out" for the
use of such persons.'
Limiting the protections of the Residential Rental Agreements
Act to dwelling units used as tenants' primary residences violated not
only the text of the statute, but also the policy behind its adoption.
After centuries of development based on the common-law rule of
caveat emptor, the law concerning tenants' rights in residential leases
underwent rapid change beginning in 1970 with a landmark case in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
the premises. See Tenant Status Given to Hotel 'Guests,' N.C. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 21, 1991,
at 1. Although the building seemed to have been nominally a hotel since at least 1980, a
hotel license was obtained only in January 1988 after the change of ownership. See Baker,
104 N.C. App. at 243-44,409 S.E.2d at 110.
25. See Baker, 104 N.C. App. at 243, 409 S.E.2d at 110 (stating that "none of the
plaintiffs had other residences"); id. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112 (noting that "each plaintiff
leased his apartment as his sole and permanent residence"). Other evidence showed that
some plaintiffs had resided in the building for as long as six years, that the units contained
"either one or two bedrooms, a kitchen/living room and a separate bath," and that the
weekly payments for the apartments "were referred to by each party as 'rent.' " Id.
26. Id. at 246, 409 S.E.2d at 112 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2)). One
commentator recognized that "[t]he court placed great weight on the fact that plaintiffs
leased the premises as primary residences along with other factors tending to indicate the
existence of a landlord-tenant relationship." Amy M. Campbell, Note, When a Hotel Is
Your Home, Is There Protection?, 15 CAMPBELL L. REv. 295, 302 (1993). For criticism of
the appeals court's misreading of the Residential Rental Agreements Act, see John V.
Orth, Who Is a Tenant? The Correct Definition of the Status in North Carolina, 21 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 79, 83-84 (1995).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-38 (1994).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2) (1994), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2)
(Lexis 1999). Note that the statutory test was objective. The Act was not concerned with
whether particular tenants considered a given dwelling their primary residence; rather, the
Act focused on what would "normally" have been "held out" to "residential tenants who
are using the dwelling unit as their primary residence." Id.
[Vol. 78
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Circuit, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.29 The case overturned
the common-law rule against implied covenants in residential leases
and held that a covenant of habitability is implied as a matter of law
in every residential lease. 0 By 1977, when the North Carolina
General Assembly adopted the Residential Rental Agreements Act,
thirty-eight states had joined the District of Columbia in recognizing,
either as a matter of common-law development or by legislative
enactment, an implied covenant of habitability in residential leases'
Recognition of the implied covenant of habitability secured for all
tenants the protections previously available only to those with the
bargaining power and foresight to secure an express covenant.
By misreading the Residential Rental Agreements Act, the
Conley court created a gap in the coverage not intended by the
General Assembly and unlikely to have been expected or understood
by the public. The court's misreading excluded only one type of
dwelling unit from the protections of the Act: short-term rental units,
often used for vacation purposes.3a Had the family been injured on
the deck of a hotel or motel at the beach, the law governing public
accommodations would have provided them redress.33 Had they been
renting the beach house as their "primary residence," they would
have been covered by the Act as construed by the court?' Because
they had a primary residence elsewhere, however, they were
unprotected, except to the extent the common law provided security.
Ironically, short-term leases of furnished premises at vacation spots
were one type of residential leasing that the common law did protect.
29. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN
LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:16, at 124 (1980) (describing Javins as "the leading
warranty of habitability decision").
30. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1080.
31. See Fillette, supra note 19, at 785, 787 & n.16. The task of reversing the common-
law rule fell upon the General Assembly because the North Carolina courts refused to
deviate from precedent. See id. at 786 ("By 1977 it was apparent that if landlord-tenant
relations were to escape fifteenth century England it would be by legislative reform
only.").
32. In an unpublished opinion, Spence v. Gardner, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals applied Conley to another personal injury action brought by a tenant against the
landlord of a vacation rental. No. COA99-146 (N.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 16,1999).
Rentals of a secondary residence can occur in a number of other circumstances in
addition to vacation rentals, including rentals by workers on assignment away from home
and by parents who wish to stay near a child in a hospital. Students in college renting a
house together may also have primary residences elsewhere.
33. See Rappaport v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 296 N.C. 382,383-84,250 S.E.2d 245,247
(1979) (stating that an innkeeper is "liable for injuries resulting from his failure to exercise
ordinary care to keep in a reasonably safe condition that part of the premises where,
during business hours, guests and other invitees may be expected").
34. See Conley, 350 N.C. at 295,513 S.E.2d at 558.
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But the Conley court misunderstood the common law as well as the
statute.
II. THE COMMON LAW
The Conley court that the common law imposed no duty of
fitness on a residential landlord, even one letting furnished dwellings
for a short term.35 The common law certainly treated leases as a form
of conveyance.3 6 With respect to both deeds and leases, the common-
law rule was that there could be no implied covenants. In the absence
of an express covenant concerning fitness, neither a grantee under a
deed nor a tenant under a lease had an action in contract or tort. The
rule was based on the doctrine of caveat emptor, which placed the
burden on the conveyee, whether purchaser or tenant, to inspect the
premises and determine their suitability or to secure an express
covenant. 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly adopted
this rationale.3 8
The court, however, ignored the fact that the common law has
long admitted an exception to the rule of caveat emptor in cases in
which the tenant has no reasonable opportunity to inspect the
premises. The leading cases, both English and American, involve the
rental of furnished dwellings for short terms; more specifically, they
involve vacation properties rented at a distance. In Smith v.
Marrable,3 9 decided by the English Court of Exchequer in 1843, a
tenant had rented a furnished house at Brighton, then a particularly
fashionable resort on the English Channel.n0 When the premises
proved to be unfit for occupation, the tenant vacated and ceased
paying rent. The English judges unanimously held that the tenant
35. Compare Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 309, 312-13, 502
S.E.2d 688, 691 (1998) (recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in short-term
leases of furnished premises), rev'd, 350 N.C. at 297, 513 S.E.2d at 559, with Conley, 350
N.C. at 297, 513 S.E.2d at 559 (overruling the court of appeals and holding that the
common law imposed no duty on residential landlords renting furnished premises for a
short term).
36. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 215 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (describing
the principal forms of conveyance at common law as feoffment, lease, grant, and
mortgage).
37. See 1 id. at 267 (stating the rule concerning leases); JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN
W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF PROPERTY 292 (3d ed. 1989) (stating the rule
concerning deeds).
38. See Conley, 350 N.C. at 296, 513 S.E.2d at 559 (citing Robinson v. Thomas, 244
N.C. 732,736, 94 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1956)).
39. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
40. See G.M. TREvELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 492 (1942) ("Brighton,
famous for the patronage of [King] George IV and for the Pavilion he had built there, was
already [in the early nineteenth century] an adjunct of London.").
[Vol. 78
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was discharged. As explained by Chief Baron Abinger, "[a] man who
lets a ready-furnished house surely does so under the implied
condition or obligation-call it which you will-that the house is in a
fit state to be inhabited."'" The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reached the same result in 1892 in Ingalls v. Hobbs,' which
involved the rental of a furnished house at Swampscott on the
Massachusetts coast. Again the premises proved unfit, and the judges
unanimously announced:
We are of opinion that in a lease of a completely furnished
dwelling house for a single season at a summer watering
place there is an implied agreement that the house is fit for
habitation, without greater preparation than one hiring it for
a short time might reasonably be expected to make in
appropriating it to the use for which it was designed.43
In Conley, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to
recognize this exception to the general rule of caveat emptor. The
court's reasoning was brief. First, the court noted that "[t]he
'common law' which we have held is to be applied in North Carolina
'is the common law of England to the, extent it was in force and use
within this State at the time of the Declaration of Independence.' "I
Second, the court pointed out that "[h]istoricay, North Carolina has
applied the rule of caveat emptor to landlord-tenant relations."45
Third, the court concluded that "[t]his Court has never adopted an
implied warranty of suitability doctrine as an exception to our
traditional landlord-tenant law, and we decline to do so now."'
The court's statement concerning the reception of the common
law is clearly correct. A statute continuously in effect in North
Carolina since its establishment as a state provides:
All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in
force and use within this State, or so much of the common
law as is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent
with, the freedom and independence of this State and the
form of government therein established, and which has not
been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not
abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby
41. Smith, 152 Eng. Rep. at 694.
42. 31 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1892).
43. Id. at 287.
44. Conley, 350 N.C. at 296, 513 S.E.2d at 559 (quoting Gwathmey v. State, 342 N.C.
287,296, 464 S.E.2d 674,679 (1995)).
45. Id. (citing Robinson v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 732,736, 94 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1956)).
46. Id. at 297,513 S.E.2d at 559.
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declared to in full force within this State.47
Case law also establishes the date of reception as July 4, 1776, the
date of the Declaration of Independence.'
The common law as it was at the time of American independence
certainly included the rule of caveat emptor in the general law of
sales, both of real and personal property. Sir Edward Coke expressed
the rule in his commentaries on Littleton's Tenures in 1628: "Note,
that by the civil [that is, Roman] law every man is bound to warrant
the thing that he selleth or conveyeth, albeit there be no expresse
warranty; but the common law bindeth him not, unlesse there be a
warranty, either in deed or in law; for caveat emptor ....
Until the adoption of the Residential Rental Agreements Act in
1977, North Carolina courts applied the common-law rule of caveat
emptor to landlord-tenant relations. In 1956, in Robinson v.
Thomas,50 for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a
judgment in favor of a landlord and her rental agent when a tenant
was injured by the collapse of a porch.51 The court explained that
"'[o]rdinarily, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to the lessee.' "52
Consequently, "the landlord is under no duty to make repairs" and
"[t]he owner is not liable for personal injury caused by failure to
repair."53 Today, of course, the Act would impose on the landlord the
duty to keep the premises, including the porch, in a "fit and habitable
condition," and a violation could be used as evidence of negligence.5 4
What is not so clear is that the common-law rule of caveat
emptor applied to every case of landlord-tenant relations. As old as
the rule of caveat emptor is another common-law rule: cessante
ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, or "the reason of the law ceasing, the
law itself also ceases."'55 Therefore, when inspection would not have
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986).
48. See Gwathmey, 342 N.C. at 296,464 S.E.2d at 679.
49. 1 EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LrITLETON § 145, at 102a (1853); see
also HERBERT BROOM, A SELECriON OF LEGAL MAXIMS 501-24 (W.J. Byme ed., 9th
ed. 1924) (discussing the rule of caveat emptor). But cf. Walter H. Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1136 (1931) ("Caveat emptor is not to be found
among the reputable ideas of the Middle Ages.").
50. 244 N.C. 732,94 S.E.2d 911 (1956).
51. See id. at 737, 94 S.E.2d at 915.
52. Id. at 736, 94 S.E.2d at 914 (quoting Harrill v. Sinclair Refining Co., 225 N.C. 421,
425,35 S.E.2d 240,242 (1945)).
53. Id.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2) (1994), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2)
(Lexis 1999); id. § 42-42(a)(2) (Supp. 1998); see also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying
text (stating that a violation of the Act can constitute evidence of negligence).
55. See 1 COKE, supra note 49, § 96, at 70b; see also BROOM, supra note 49, at 110-12
792 [Vol. 78
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revealed a defect, a tenant was not charged with having notice of it.
In Robinson, for example, the court explained that the rule of caveat
emptor would not apply if the tenant could show
that there is a latent defect known to the lessor, or which he
should have known, involving a menace of danger, and a
defect of which the lessee was unaware or could not, by the
exercise of ordinary diligence, discover, the concealment of
which would be an act of bad faith on the part of the lessor.5 6
Equally, when a prospective tenant has no opportunity to inspect
the premises before leasing, caveat emptor was inapplicable5 7 A
lease entered into at a distance from the premises was an obvious
example. 8 Before the Residential Rental Agreements Act was
adopted, the rule of caveat emptor operated to encourage inspection
before leasing by assigning the risk of unsuitability or injury to the
tenant. While the Act eliminated this incentive in the leasing of
primary residences, according to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
the rule of caveat emptor remained to penalize tenants who leased
furnished premises for short-term residence-usually vacationers
leasing at a distance-despite the obvious fact that inspection in such
cases would be much more difficult than it is when renting primary
residences.
This remnant of the rule of caveat emptor was particularly
anomalous given the wholesale renovation of the law of sales. The
Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in North Carolina, creates an
implied warranty of fitness in the ordinary sale of personal property. 9
The Residential Rental Agreements Act, as we have seen, imposed
an implied covenant of habitability in leases. The legislature, in other
words, had banished the rule of caveat emptor in the large majority of
sales and leases.
The North Carolina Supreme Court also had departed from the
common-law rule of caveat emptor in significant respects. For
(discussing the common-law maxim).
56. Robinson, 244 N.C. at 736, 94 S.E.2d at 914 (quoting Harrill, 225 N.C. at 425, 35
S.E.2d at 242). The plaintiffs injured by the collapsing deck in Conley had presented
evidence that the collapse was caused by "corroded nails and the absence of lag bolts."
Conley v. Emerald Isle Realty, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 309, 311, 502 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1998),
rev'd, 350 N.C. 293,513 S.E.2d 556 (1999). Thus, it would appear that the family could not
have discovered the defect in the property through the exercise of ordinary diligence.
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113,121 (1931) (discussing the
inapplicability of the caveat-emptor rule to the purchase of an unfinished structure).
58. Another example would be a lease to commence in the future of unconstructed or
incomplete premises. Inspection in this case is literally impossible.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-314 (Lexis 1999).
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instance, in the 1974 case of Hartley v. Ballou,° the court recognized
an implied covenant in the sale of residential real estate.6' In that
case, a builder conveyed newly constructed housing, and the court
held that an implied covenant of workmanlike construction applied to
the transaction.62 A year later in Hinson v. Jefferson,63 the court
recognized a second implied covenant. Acknowledging that "[t]he
basic and underlying principle of Hartley is a recognition that in some
situations the rigid common law maxim of caveat emptor is
inequitable," 6 the court held that a deed including restrictive
covenants limiting the use of the premises to single-family dwellings
included by implication a covenant of suitability for such use.65
Although the common law as it was in 1776 permitted no implied
covenants in deeds or leases, the court 200 years later was willing to
make an exception, at least in the case of deeds.6 After the supreme
60. 286 N.C. 51,209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
61. See id. at 57,209 S.E.2d at 780.
62. The court explained the implied covenant of workmanlike construction as follows:
[W]e hold that in every contract for the sale of a recently completed dwelling,
and in every contract for the sale of a dwelling under construction, the vendor, if
he be in the business of building such dwellings, shall be held to impliedly
warrant to the initial vendee that, at the time of the passing of the deed or the
taking of possession by the initial vendee (whichever first occurs), the dwelling,
together with all its fixtures, is sufficiently free from major structural defects, and
is constructed in a workmanlike manner, so as to meet the standard of
workmanlike quality then prevailing at the time and place of construction; and
that this implied warranty in the contract of sale survives the passing of the deed
or the taking of possession by the initial vendee.
Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783. The final aspect of the holding, stating that the implied
warranty in the contract of sale survives the delivery of the deed, was necessary to negate
the doctrine of merger by deed, the common-law rule that covenants or warranties in
contracts of sale "merge" into the deed and therefore are no longer enforceable. See Paul
Teich, A Second Call for Abolition of the Rule of Merger by Deed, 71 U. DET. MERcY L.
REV. 543,543 (1994).
63. 287 N.C. 422,215 S.E.2d 102 (1975).
64. Id. at 435,215 S.E.2d at 111.
65. See id. The court explained the implied warranty of suitability as follows:
[W]e hold that where a grantor conveys land subject to restrictive covenants that
limit its use to the construction of a single-family dwelling, and, due to
subsequent disclosures, both unknown and not reasonably discoverable by the
grantee before or at the time of conveyance, the property cannot be used by the
grantee, or by any subsequent grantees through mesne conveyances, for the
specific purpose to which its use is limited by the restrictive covenants, the
grantor breaches an implied warranty arising out of said restrictive covenants.
Id.
66. For notes concerning later developments in the law of implied covenants of
habitability, see generally Dwight F. Hopewell, Oates v. JAG: Let the Builder Beware-A
Remedy for Subsequent Purchasers of Homes in North Carolina, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1485
(1986); Carolyn Whitney Minshall, Note, Another Look at the Implied Warranty of
Habitability in North Carolina, 64 N.C. L. RBV. 869 (1986); Peter Wayne Schneider, Note,
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court's decision in Conley, the tenant of a vacation or secondary
residence remained as a lonely victim of the rule of caveat emptor.
Legislative amendment of the Residential Rental Agreements
Act was the speediest and simplest way to reverse the effect of
Conley.67 The General Assembly could have restored the Act's
original meaning by amending the "Application" section. Instead,
the legislature deleted the reference to "primary residence" in the
limitation on "grounds, areas, and facilities" included within the
definition of "premises."'  Although the "grounds, areas, and
facilities" previously included in the coverage were those "normally
held out for the use of residential tenants who are using the dwelling
unit as their primary residence," the "grounds, areas, and facilities"
now covered are those "normally held out for the use of residential
tenants." It is unclear how many more "grounds, areas, and facilities"
are now included.
III. THE VACATION RENTAL AcT
The Vacation Rental Act applies to owners and real estate
brokers engaged in the leasing of residential property for vacation
rental.69 Like the Residential Rental Agreements Act, the Vacation
Rental Act excludes transient occupation of public accommodations
and gratuitous leases.70 In addition, the Vacation Rental Act excludes
two other types of rentals: "[r]entals to persons temporarily renting a
dwelling unit when traveling away from their primary residence for
business or employment purposes ' 71 and "[r]entals to persons having
no other place of primary residence."'72 Also, by limiting the
The Implied Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina Revisited, 58 N.C. L. REv. 1055
(1980).
67. One justice on the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly called for legislation
to effect "a badly needed change in this area of landlord-tenant liability." Conley, 350
N.C. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at 560 (Frye, J., concurring).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-40(2) (Lexis 1999).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42A-3 (Lexis 1999). In addition to extending the
covenant of habitability to vacation rentals, id. §§ 42A-31 to -35, the Vacation Rental Act
also includes detailed provisions concerning vacation rental agreements, id. §§ 42A-10 to -
14, the handling of rents and security deposits, it. §§ 42A-15 to -22, expedited eviction
proceedings, id. §§ 42A-23 to -30, and the consequences of mandatory evacuations of
vacation areas, id. §§ 42A-36 to -40.
70. Id. §§ 42A-3(b)(1), -4.
71. Id, § 42A-3(b)(2). A rental incident to a trip with both business and vacation
purposes could require a difficult assessment of the relative importance of each purpose.
72. Id, § 42A-3(b)(3). As between two or more dwellings, it may be difficult to
determine which is the "primary residence." Retired persons may spend part of the year
in one residence and part in another. Determining residency for state inheritance taxes,
interpretation of wills and trusts, creditors' rights, and many other matters is notoriously
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definition of "vacation rental" to a rental "for fewer than 90 days by a
person who has a place of permanent residence to which he or she
intends to return," 73 the Vacation Rental Act limits both the duration
of covered vacation rentals and the character of the covered tenants.
Excluding tenants who are not renting premises for vacation purposes
from the Vacation Rental Act is perhaps understandable. Less
understandable is the exclusion of rentals, even of vacation property,
to tenants who rent for 90 days or more and who have another place
serving as their "primary" or "permanent" residence.
The exclusion of these rentals would be relatively harmless if the
Residential Rental Agreements Act, as amended, covered them. The
amendment of the Residential Rental Agreements Act adopted
incident to the passage of the Vacation Rental Act, however, did not
expressly extend the scope of the Residential Rental Agreements Act
to these rentals or indeed to any rentals not already covered. Even as
amended, the Residential Rental Agreements Act "determines the
rights, obligations, and remedies under a rental agreement for a
dwelling unit within this State" and excludes only transient occupancy
in places of public accommodation, gratuitous leases, and vacation
rentals. As interpreted by the supreme court in Conley, the Act also
excludes rentals of dwellings used as other than primary residences.
The recent amendment to the Residential Rental Agreements
Act alters the definition of the word "premises," a word not used in
either the section on the scope of the Act or in the section on
exclusions from the Act. All it did, seemingly, was to expand the type
of premises that must be kept fit and habitable if otherwise covered
by the Act. If the Residential Rental Agreements Act is indeed to
govern all residential leasings except vacation rentals, as seems to be
the legislative intent, it would be desirable for the General Assembly
to act once more by adding a second clarification to the
"Application" section: "This Article applies, subject to the exclusions
contained elsewhere in this Article, to every dwelling unit subject to a
rental agreement within this State, regardless of whether or not the
dwelling unit is used as the tenant's primary residence." Such an
amendment would clearly correct the mistaken holding in Conley
concerning the scope of the Act. In the absence of further legislative
action, it may be hoped that the supreme court would interpret the
recent amendment as an implied correction of Conley. As amended,
difficult. See, e.g., RANDELL C. DOANE & REBECCA G. DOANE, DEATH AND TAXES:
THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO FAMILY INHERITANCE PLANNING 163 (1998).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42A-4(3).
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the Residential Rental Agreements Act no longer mentions the
words "primary residence" in any section. Therefore, it would seem
anomalous with the statute as it now stands to continue to limit the
Act to "premises which are 'normally held out for the use of
residential tenants who are using the dwelling unit as their primary
residence.' "74
CONCLUSION
By misreading the Residential Rental Agreements Act, the
North Carolina Supreme Court created an unfortunate gap in the
statutory coverage. By misunderstanding the common law,
specifically the rule of caveat emptor, the court compounded the
problem. Although almost all sales and leases, both of real and
personal property, are covered by implied covenants of fitness
imposed by statute or case law, some leases were left unprotected.
Tenants leasing beach cottages are now covered by the Vacation
Rental Act, but unless the General Assembly amends the Act again
or the North Carolina Supreme Court interprets the General
Assembly's recent amendment to expand the coverage of the Act, a
certain fraction of leases will remain unprotected. Students at college
renting a house, workers on assignment renting an apartment, or
legislators occupying apartments in Raleigh during a session of the
General Assembly may not be protected.
74. Conley, 350 N.C. at 295, 513 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2)
(1994)).
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